Abstract. Justification Logics are special kinds of modal logics which provide a framework for reasoning about epistemic justification. For this, they extend classical boolean propositional logic by a family of necessity-style modal operators "t :", indexed over t by a corresponding set of justification terms, which thus explicitly encode the justification for the necessity assertion in the syntax. With these operators, one can therefore not only reason about modal effects on propositions but also about dynamics inside the justifications themselves. We replace this classical boolean base with Gödel logic, one of the three most prominent fuzzy logics, i.e. special instances of many-valued logics, taking values in the unit interval [0, 1], which are intended to model inference under vagueness. We extend the canonical possible-world semantics for Justification Logic to this fuzzy realm by considering fuzzy accessibility-and evaluation-functions evaluated over the minimum t-norm and establish strong completeness theorems for various fuzzy analogies of prominent extensions for basic Justification Logic.
Introduction
Epistemology and its core notions like knowledge, belief, truth and justification have, since Hintikka's seminal work [24] , found natural formalizations in the realm of modal logics and in their fundamental semantical interpretation over Kripke's possible-world models. The formal development of Justification Logic began with the so called logic of proofs which extends basic propositional logic by a family of modal, necessity-style unary operators, introducing formulas of the form t : φ, where the indexing parameter t ranges over a corresponding set of proof terms. This logic was devised by Artemov in [1] , [2] , to provide an arithmetic provability semantics for intiutionistic logic and bridge intuitionistic logic, the modal logic S4 and formal arithmetic, a possibility anticipated by Gödel in [21] , [22] where he provided an embedding of intuitionistic logic into S4 and conceptualized the provability interpretation of the modality in S4. However, an explicit embedding of S4 into formal arithmetic was still left out. The missing link was then provided by the logic of proofs LP, for which Artemov provided an embedding into formal arithmetic via the Arithmetic Completeness Theorem and an embedding of S4 into LP via Artemov's Realization Theorem, assigning explicit proof terms to necessity-statements, which forms an intricate relation between classical modal logics and Justification Logics.
From a modern perspective, LP is just one of various logical systems in the framework of Justification Logic, similarly to S4's position inside the common framework of classical modal logics. Kripke-style possible-world semantics for the logic of proofs were introduced in [16] , [17] , with the structures prominently called Fittingmodels, and later naturally extended to the various other representatives of the class of Justification Logics. As later observed, the Realization Theorem also extends to other representatives of the respective frameworks of classical modal and Justification Logics. For a comprehensive overview over the framework of Justification Logics, see e.g. [3] .
Gödel logic on the other hand is a very prominent example of a many-valued logic, with evaluations into the unit interval [0, 1] , dating back to a paper of Gödel [20] where he introduced finite valued versions to provide an infinite family of logics between intuitionistic and classical logic with respect to expressive strength. The version taking values in the unit interval [0, 1] was first studied by Dummett in [11] who also provided the first proof calculus in terms of a simple extension of a common Hilbert calculus for intuitionistic logic. A first-order variant of this infinitely-valued version was followingly studied by Horn [25] (see also [5] ). Besides of this intuitionistic access to Gödel logic, a prominent different approach, and the one followed in this paper, is given via the route of mathematical fuzzy logic, deriving from the concept of fuzzy sets originating in Zadeh's landmark work [33] , and originating mainly from the seminal monograph of Hájek [23] . Semantically, fuzzy logics are defined over the notion of a t-norm (triangular norm, see e.g. [26] ) as a truth function for conjunction, where Gödel logic results in the case of considering the minimum t-norm as a particular choice.
From an application perspective, it seems very natural to combine Justification Logics with a notion of vagueness to model e.g. uncertain epistemic assertions, and thus in a more explicit manner to combine fuzzy logic and particularly Gödel logic with Justification Logic in the sense of adding justification modalities to the underlying propositional language and evaluating them in a many-valued context. Similarly as fuzzy logic has proved itself to be one of the right tools to express and analyze vague propositional assertions, we believe that fuzzy Justification Logic shall be a right tool to model uncertain (explicit) epistemic assertions.
Examples for combinations of Justification Logic with other systems (or notions) of vagueness (or probability) include Milnikel's logic of uncertain justifications [29] where Milnikel introduces a graded justification operator t : r φ for r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1] with the intended meaning of r being the least degree of confidence in "t being a justification for φ"; and recently also the development of probabilistic Justification Logic, see e.g. [27] , and possibilistic Justification Logic, see e.g. [13] .
At the time, the only literature on fuzzy Justification Logics is Ghari's work in [18] and [19] where he introduced the notion of fuzzy Fitting-models (with a crisp accessibility function) for respective t-norms, here later redefined for the case of Gödel logic, and especially investigated the extension of Pavelka-style fuzzy logic. However, the study of models with graded accessibility functions and the derivation of strong completeness theorems was still left open in any case.
In this note, we concretisize and expand the work of Ghari in [18] and thus continue to expand the realm of fuzzy Justification Logics. We focus on Gödel logics as an underlying base logic and introduce respective fuzzy Fitting-models with fuzzy accessibility functions. The main part is occupied with the study of fuzzy analogies of the most prominent Justification Logics and their semantics as well as their axiomatizations where we establish strong completeness results in every case. To approach this, we translate modality-containing formulas into an augmented basic propositional language and use the strong standard completeness of the underlying propositional systems. In general, we heavily rely on various concepts of standard Gödel modal logic, i.e. propositional Gödel logic expanded by a classical necessity and possibility modality and ♦, originating in [8] , [9] and [10] , (studying the necessity and possibility fragments as well as the Bi-model variant respectively), where especially the structure of our approach to proving strong standard completeness is derived from. For a comprehensive overview over fuzzy modal logic and related advancements to completeness results for various modal fuzzy logics over crisp models, see also e.g. [31] . However, we do not recap the main notions from these works as they will be introduced in their adapted form for the case of fuzzy (Gödel) Justification Logic during the note as appropriate. In the end, we give some starting points for directions of future work.
Preliminaries
The basis for our further investigations is classical propositional [0, 1]-valued Gödel logic. Formally, for this we fix a standard propositional language
with p ∈ X for a countably infinite set of variables X. We may fix a standard set of propositional variables with V ar = {p i | i ∈ N}. As an abbreviation, we then also write L 0 := L 0 (V ar). As usual in propositional logics, we omit the outermost brackets if convenient. Other common connectives are introduced as an abbreviation, i.e. we set
⊤ := (⊥ → ⊥). Semantics for propositional Gödel logics are defined via truth value assignments in the unit interval [0, 1], where conjunction is evaluated over the minimum t-norm min{x, y} for x, y ∈ [0, 1], in the following denoted with x ⊙ y, and implication over its residuum ⇒, that is the unique function ⇒:
In the case of the minimum t-norm, the residuum has the following description:
Definition 2.1. A propositional assignment is a function e : X → [0, 1]. This function can be naturally extended to a propositional Gödel evaluation over L 0 (X) by the following recursive definitions:
An evaluation e may also be extended to sets of formulas Γ via
For the derived connectives, simplifying the corresponding evaluations yield the following expressions:
(1) e(¬φ) = 1, if e(φ) = 0 0, otherwise
The resulting truth functions corresponding to ¬, ↔ and ∨ are respectively denoted by ∼, ⇔ and ⊕. With Ev(L 0 (X)), we denote the set of all evaluations of L 0 (X) into [0, 1] , that is the set of all maps e : X → [0, 1], extended to L 0 (X) by the above definition.
Before proceeding with other semantic notions, we want to note some properties of the minimum t-norm ⊙ and its derived functions.
The proof is very elementary and thus omitted here.
From these definitions regarding semantic evaluations, analogues for the case of Gödel logic of other common semantical notions can now be derived.
However, as observed by Baaz and Zach, these two notions of semantic inference coincide (for countable sets of premises).
Through the approach to Gödel logics via the framework of fuzzy logics, we consider an extension of Hájek's proof calculus for basic fuzzy logic BL [23] by the idempotency axiom for conjunction as the corresponding proof calculus for axiomatizing the above defined semantic consequence relation of basic propositional Gödel logic.
Definition 2.5. Let G be the Hilbert-style calculus given by the following axioms 1 and rules:
Lemma 2.6 (Hájek [23] ). G proves the following formulas:
While item (1) and (2) are even theorems for Hájek's basic logic BL, item (3) is a particular feature of Gödel logic, distinguishing it from the other prominent t-norm based logics. This lemma is also the reason for why the usual proof of the classical deduction theorem works in Gödel logic.
with p ∈ V ar = {p i | i ∈ N} as before and t ∈ Jt where
with x ∈ V = {x i | i ∈ N} a variable symbole and c ∈ C = {c i ∈ N} a constant symbole.
The same rules for simplification of bracketing formulas as well as definitions for derived connectives as presented in the preliminaries apply here.
In practice, there are many different variants for possible sets of justification terms, with some extensions and reductions of the set Jt as defined above present. In general, a set of justification terms is expected to at least contain a countable set of variables and constants as well as to be closed under the · and + operations. The !-operator, originating from the "initial" justification logic LP, and the ?-operator, relating to positive and negative introspection in explicit modal logics respectively, are of greater importance for common extensions investigated later. There is, however, no disadvantage in allowing them right away.
, where E satisfies the closure conditions
, for all t, s ∈ Jt, φ, ψ ∈ L J and w ∈ W . The class of all Gödel-Justification models is denoted by GJ. We say that a Gödel-Justification model is (simply) finite if W is finite.
These models are inspired by Gödel-Kripke models, originally introduced in [8] , [9] , which form a similar fuzzy possbile-world semantics for standard modal Gödel logics. 3 We extend the evaluation function e of a GJ-model from V ar to the whole language L J via the following inductive rules, for each world w ∈ W :
• e(w,
} As an abuse of notation, we write e(w, φ) = inf v∈W {R(w, v) ⇒ e(v, φ)} in connection to classical Gödel modal logic [9] although of course φ, that is the classical necessity-style operator in general, is not part of the underlying language. Following to this, we may rephrase the definition of the semantic evaluation of t : φ with e(w, t : φ) = E(t, φ, w) ⊙ e(w, φ).
At a world w in a GJ-model M = W, R, E, e , we may also extend e(w, ·) to sets of formulas Γ ⊆ L J with setting e(w, Γ) = inf ψ∈Γ {e(w, ψ)}.
For a class of GJ-models C, we denote the subclass of all crisp models in C by Cc. Similarly to classical Gödel modal logics, we may now define the usual semantical notion of (local ) satisfiability in a model. 2 These conditions represent natural generalizations of the classical conditions on boolean Fitting-models, i.e. restricting E to {0, 1} returns them in a translated form. 3 The concept of many-valued Kripke models in the context of modal logics, especially with many-valued accessbility functions, was initiated by the work of Fitting in [14] , [15] where he studied a variant taking values in a finite lattice.
and similarly for sets Γ
This yields, similarly to the basic propositional case, two analogues for local semantic inference in modal logic for fuzzy Fitting-models.
Definition 3.4. Let Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ L J and C a class of GJ-models. We say that
A formula φ is called C-valid, for a class of GJ-models C, if ∅ |= C φ. In this case, we also just write |= C φ.
Lemma 3.5. For any class of GJ-models C and any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ L J : Γ |= C≤ φ implies Γ |= C φ.
Proof. Let C be a class of GJ-models and assume Γ |= C≤ φ. Thus,
Now, let w ∈ D(M) for some M ∈ C and suppose (M, w) |= Γ, i.e. ∀ψ ∈ Γ : e(w, ψ) = 1. Thus inf ψ∈Γ {e(w, ψ)} = 1. By the above, we have 1 = inf ψ∈Γ {e(w, ψ)} ≤ e(w, φ) ≤ 1, i.e. e(w, φ) = 1 and thus (M, w) |= φ. Thus Γ |= C φ.
Lemma 3.6 (Caicedo, Rodriguez [9] ). For any GJ-model M, any w ∈ D(M) and any φ, ψ ∈ L J : e(w, (φ → ψ)) ⊙ e(w, φ) ≤ e(w, ψ).
By properties of ⊙ and the residuum ⇒, the result may also be rephrased as e(w, (φ → ψ)) ≤ e(w, φ) ⇒ e(w, ψ) for any GJ-model M and w ∈ D(M).
Definition 3.7. Let GJ 0 be the following axiomatic extension of the proof calculus for standard propositional Gödel logic G:
The axioms of the calculus G.
We denote inference of a formula φ ∈ L J from a set of formulas Γ ⊆ L J in this calculus by Γ ⊢ GJ 0 φ(or Γ ⊢ φ if the context is clear). Proof. Let M = W, R, E, e be a GJ-model and w ∈ W . φ) ) by commutativity and associativity of ⊙. As E(t, φ → ψ, w) ⊙ E(s, φ, w) ≤ E(t · s, ψ, w) by property (i) on E of a GJ-model and e(w, (φ → ψ))⊙ e(w, φ) ≤ e(w, ψ) by Lem. 3.6, we have through monotonicity of ⊙:
Thus, e(w, t : (φ → ψ)) ⊙ e(w, s : φ) ≤ e(w, [t · s] : ψ), i.e. by properties of the residuum e(w, t :
We just show the first case, as the second case follows similarly. We have e(w, t : φ) = E(t, φ, w)⊙e(w, φ).
By E(t, φ, w) ⊕ E(s, φ, w) ≤ E(t + s, φ, w), we have E(t, φ, w) ≤ E(t + s, φ, w). Thus again by monotinicity of ⊙, we have E(t, φ, w) ⊙ e(w, φ) ≤ E(t + s, φ, w) ⊙ e(w, φ) = e(w, [t + s] : φ).
3.1. Constant specifications and internalization. Constant specifications are a weakened implementation of the principle of logical awareness, i.e. regarding axioms to be self-evidently justified, with weakened in the sense that we may restrict this view to a corresponding subset of the axioms in question. From a basic practical point, a constant specification helps an agent to make more justified inference.
Definition 3.9. For a given proof calculus S, defined over the corresponding language L J , a constant specification is a set CS of formulas of the form
for φ and axiom of S and c i constants for all i = 1, . . . , n. Additionally, a constant specification is expected to be downward closed, i.e. if c n : c n−1 : · · · : c 1 : φ ∈ CS, then c i : · · · : c 1 : φ for all i = 1, . . . , n − 1.
We
Clearly, GJ 0 relates to GJ ∅ . Similarly as propositional Gödel logic, Gödel Justification Logic enjoys the classical deduction theorem, which is a notable exception in comparison to other representatives in the framework of fuzzy (justification) logic.
The proof is essentially the same as in the case of classical (Justification) Logic, proceeding via the usual induction, employing Lem. 2.6, and is thus omitted. Proof. Let c n : · · · : c 1 : φ ∈ CS and let M = W, R, E, e be a GJ-model respecting CS. Now, as CS is downward closed, we have c k : · · · : c 1 : φ ∈ CS for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have E(c k , c k−1 : · · · : c 1 : φ, w) = 1 for all w ∈ W . As φ is an axiom of GJ CS , we have, as all axioms are GJ-valid, that e(w, φ) = 1 for all w ∈ W . Thus, e(w, φ) = 1 for all w ∈ W and thus e(w, c 1 : φ) = E(c 1 , φ, w) ⊙ e(w, φ) = 1 for all w ∈ W . From this, we have that e(w, c 2 : c 1 : φ) = E(c 2 , c 1 : φ, w) ⊙ e(w, c 1 : φ) = 1. Continuing this up to n gives e(w, c n : · · · : c 1 : φ) = E(c n , c n−1 : · · · : c 1 : φ, w) ⊙ e(w, c n−1 : · · · : c 1 : φ) = 1 for all w ∈ W . Definition 3.14. We say that GJ CS enjoys internalization, if ⊢ GJ CS φ implies that there exists a justification term t ∈ Jt s.t. ⊢ GJ CS t : φ.
Lemma 3.15 (Lifting lemma). Let CS be axiomatically appropriate. If {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } ⊢ GJ CS φ, then for any justification terms t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ Jt there is a justification term t ∈ Jt s.t. {t 1 : ψ 1 , . . . , t n : ψ n } ⊢ GJ CS t : φ.
The proof of this lemma is strictly similar to the proof in the classical case (see e.g. [2] , [28] ) and thus omitted here. The following is a direct consequence of the Lifting lemma.
Lemma 3.16. Let CS be a constant specification: If CS is axiomatically appropriate, then GJ CS enjoys internalization.
Lemma 3.17 (Soundness of GJ CS
Proof. We have that Γ ⊢ GJ CS φ implies {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } ⊢ GJ CS φ for some {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } ⊆ Γ. By repeated application of the deduction theorem, we have ⊢ GJ CS n i=1 ψ i → φ. As of Prop. 3.8, all axioms of GJ CS are valid. Of course (M P ), and as of Lem. 3.13, also (CS) preserve validity (in GJ CS ). We thus have |= GJ CS n i=1 ψ i → φ. Thus, for any GJ CS -model M and any w ∈ D(M), we have (M, w) |= n i=1 ψ i → φ, i.e. e(w, Γ) ≤ e(w, n i=1 ψ i ) ≤ e(w, φ), as {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } ⊆ Γ, i.e. Γ |= GJ CS ≤ φ.
Modal-type extensions
Similar to the realm of classical modal logic, the framework of classical justification logic spreads out over numerous extensions of the basic axiomatic system for justifications (similar to GJ 0 here). Of mainline importance are here explicit justification formulas standing in analogy to classical unexplicit epistemic (modal) principles like truth and positive introspection, etc. In this section, we present analogue extensions in the context of fuzzy Justification Logic, both model-theoretically, by characterizing the fuzzy versions of the associated Fitting-models, and axiomatically. We don't go into surrounding (philosphical) detail about the here studied principles, however, for an exposition in the classical case, refer to [3] . 4.1. Factivity. Definition 4.1. We define the following extensions:
(1) Proof. Let M = W, R, E, e ∈ GJT and let w ∈ W . Then e(w, t : φ) = E(t, φ, w) ⊙ inf v∈W {R(w, v) ⇒ e(v, φ)} ≤ R(w, w) ⇒ e(w, φ) = e(w, φ)
where the last equality follows from R(w, w) = 1 f.a. w ∈ W , as M is reflexive.
Similarly as before, we obtain the soundness of GJ T CS (for some CS for GJ T 0 ) w.r.t. its intended model class and the proof is thus omitted here.
Lemma 4.4 (Soundness of GJ T CS
). For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ L J : Γ ⊢ GJ T CS φ implies Γ |= GJT CS ≤ φ.
Positive introspection.
Definition 4.5. We define the following extensions of GJ CS :
(1) GJ 4 CS = GJ CS + (P I) : t : φ →!t : t : φ (2) GLP CS = GJ T CS + (P I) : t : φ →!t : t : φ
We can now find similar fuzzy analogues to the classical additional properties of Fitting-models regarding positive introspection.
Definition 4.6. With GJ4, we denote that class of Gödel-Justification models
. The subclass of all reflexive GJ4-models is denoted respectively with GLP.
Lemma 4.7 (Caicedo, Rodriguez [9] ). In a (min-)transitive GJ-model M = W, R, E, e , it holds for any w, v ∈ W and any φ ∈ L J that e(w, φ) ≤ R(w, v) ⇒ e(v, φ).
Proposition 4.8. The scheme t : φ →!t : t : φ is valid in the class GJ4.
Proof. Let M = W, R, E, e be a GJ4-model and w ∈ W . Now, we have
by monotonicity of E over R and properties of the residuum for every v ∈ W . By Lem. 4.7 and monotonicity of ⊙, we have thus
and thus, we have e(w, t : φ) ≤ inf v∈W {R(w, v) ⇒ e(v, t : φ)}. Similarly, we have e(w, t : φ) = E(t, φ, w) ⊙ e(w, φ) ≤ E(!t, t : φ, w)
by positive introspecitivty and properties of ⊙. Thus, finally e(w, t : φ) ≤ E(!t, t : φ, w) ⊙ inf v∈W {R(w, v) ⇒ e(v, t : φ)} = e(w, !t : t : φ)
and therefore e(w, t : φ →!t : t : φ) = 1.
We thus again readily obtain the following: The class of GJ4-models satisfying (i) ∼ E(t, φ, w) ≤ E(?t, ¬t : φ, w) f.a. t ∈ Jt, φ ∈ L J , w ∈ W (negative introspectivity of E), (ii) E(t, φ, w) ≤ e(w, t : φ) f.a. t ∈ Jt, φ ∈ L J , w ∈ W (strong evidence), is denoted by GJ45. The class of all GJ45-model with reflexive accessibility function is in the following denoted by GJT45.
Proposition 4.12. The scheme ¬t : φ →?t : ¬t : φ is valid in the model class GJ45.
Proof. Let M = W, R, E, e be a GJ45-model. We have that e(w, ¬t : φ) =∼ e(w, t : φ) ≤ ∼ E(t, φ, w) (by strong evidence and Lem. 2.2)
≤ E(?t, ¬t : φ, w) (by negative introspection)
≤ e(w, ?t : ¬t : φ) (by strong evidence)
Completeness (IS):
If the length is greater than 1, the last rule in the deduction was essentially
By the induction hypothesis, as the corresponding proofs are necessarily shorter, we have Γ
c , is defined as follows:
(1)
e c is extended to L J as before.
Lemma 5.5 (Truth lemma
Proof. Induction on the structure of the formula φ.
(IB): For the base case of φ = p ∈ V ar, we have e
For the induction step, we divide between the different connectives.
We have, for
Hence, we are left with showing that e c (v, t : ψ) = v(ψ t ) for an arbitrary v ∈ W c , i.e. we are left to show that
Thus, it suffices to show that e c (v, ψ) ≥ v(ψ t ) by the laws of ⊙ = min. Now, by (IH), we have e c (w, ψ) = w(ψ ⋆ ) for any w ∈ W c and thus
As R c is crisp, we now have inf
c , e c has the strong evidence property, i.e.
Proof. By the Truth lemma 5.5 and the definition of
Note, that for a GJ-model M = W, R, E, e , the strong evidence property E(t, φ, w) ≤ e(w, t : φ) is obviously equivalent with the stronger assertion E(t, φ, w) = e(w, t : φ) as e(w, t : φ) = E(t, φ, w) ⊙ e(w, φ) ≤ E(t, φ, w) follows anyway by properties of ⊙.
We divide between the different possibilities for GJL CS :
GJ CS : We just need to check the three basic conditions on E c . Let v ∈ W c be arbitrary:
⋆ and thus for any v ∈ W c , we have v(φ c ) = 1, i.e. EProof. Suppose Γ ⊢ G φ. By strong standard completeness of G, Thm. 2.7, we have Γ |= φ, i.e. ∃ê ∈ Ev(L 0 ) : e(ψ) = 1 f.a. ψ ∈ Γ butê(φ) < 1. We now construct a particular GJL CS -model, which encodes this faulty evaluation:
Let M = W, R, E, e be defined over
• e(w, p) =ê(p) for all p ∈ V ar. As E(t, α, w) = 1 for any choice of t and α, it clearly respects CS. Also, as all such entries of the evidence function are equal, we have
R is trivially reflexive and (min-)transitive. As W is a singleton, we have monotonicty directly as well. Now, we can prove:
For any α ∈ L 0 : e(w, α) =ê(α). As an induction base, for α = p ∈ V ar, we have e(w, p) =ê(p) and also e(w, ⊥) = 0 =ê(⊥) per definition. The induction step for ∧ and → follows from a straightforward application of the induction hypothesis. Now, with M, we've found (in each case) a GJL CS -model s.t. e(w, ψ) =ê(ψ) = 1 f.a. ψ ∈ Γ as Γ ⊆ L 0 but e(w, φ) =ê(φ) < 1. Thus, per definition, Γ |= GJL CS φ and thus by Thm. 5.8, we have Γ ⊢ GJ L CS φ
An alternative semantics over fuzzy Mkrtychev models
Introduced in [30] , Mkrtychev models preceded Kripke-Fitting semantics for Justification Logics. From their perspective, Mkrtychev models essentially encode the necessary information concerning the justification modalities only via the admissible evidence function. In the following, we present Gödel-Mkrtychev models for our various Gödel-Justification Logics for which we proof another strong completeness theorem. Again, in the following, let GJ L CS ∈ {GJ CS , GJ T CS , GJ 4 CS , GLP CS , GJ 45 CS , GJ T 45 CS }.
where we have the following conditions on the corresponding admissible evidence function E:
e extends to L J via the following recursive rules:
• e(⊥) = 0 • e(φ ∧ ψ) = e(φ) ⊙ e(ψ)
• e(φ → ψ) = e(φ) ⇒ e(ψ)
• e(t : φ) = E(t, φ) It can be seen that, naively, Gödel-Mkrtychev models can be identified with single-world Gödel-Fitting models with a nulled accessibility function. A Gödel-Mkrtychev model respects a constant specification CS if E(c, φ) = 1 for all c : φ ∈ CS.
We denote the class of all Gödel-Mkrtychev models (all Gödel-Mkrtychev respecting a constant specification CS) by GM, GM CS respectively. (1) and (2) (2) and (1) and (4) Proof. Let M = E, e be a GMJL CS -model and let c : φ ∈ CS. Then, as M respects CS, we have E(c, φ) = 1, i.e. e(c : φ) = 1 per definition for the extended e.
Lemma 6.5 (Soundness for GM-models). For any
Proof. We divide between the different cases for GJ L CS . Also, we just check the validity of the axioms, the rest follows from Lem. 6.4 as before.
GJ CS
: To see that (J) is valid, observe that e(t : (φ → ψ)) ⊙ e(s :
. By properties of the residuum, we have e(t :
To see that (+) is valid, note that e(t : φ) = E(t, φ) ≤ E(t + s, φ) = e([t + s] : φ), similarly for the other version. GJ T CS : Naturally, we have e(t : φ) = E(t, φ) ≤ e(φ), i.e. e(t : φ → φ) = 1 by the conditions on GMT-models.
The rest follows from the GJ CS -case. GJ 4 CS : We have that e(t : φ) = E(t, φ) ≤ E(!t, t : φ) = e(!t : t : φ) by the condition of GM4-models. The rest follows again from the GJ CS -case. GLP CS : This case follows entirely from the GJ T CS and GJ 4 CS cases. GJ 45 CS : We have e(¬t : φ) =∼ e(t : φ) =∼ E(t, φ) ≤ E(?t, ¬t : φ) = e(?t : ¬t : φ), i.e. e(¬t : φ →?t : ¬t : φ) = 1. The rest follows from the GJ 4 CS -case. GJ T 45 CS : Again, the cases for GJ 45 CS and GJ T CS directly imply this one. We may derive a conservativity result for one of the remaining logics GJ 45 CS easier over the completeness theorem with respect to Mkrtychev models.
Proof. Let Γ ⊢ G φ. By Thm. 2.7, we have Γ |= φ, i.e. ∃ê ∈ Ev(L 0 ) :ê(ψ) = 1 f.a. ψ ∈ Γ withê(φ) < 1. We consider the following GM45 CS -model M = E, e :
• E(t, α) = 1 for all t ∈ Jt and α ∈ L J • e(p) =ê(p) for p ∈ V ar E clearly respects CS as before and it naively satisfies the sum and application laws for basic GM-models. Also, E(t, φ) ≤ E(!t, t : φ) trivially follows and similarly direct, we have ∼ E(t, φ) = 0 ≤ 1 = E(?t, ¬t : φ). As before, we may prove e(φ) =ê(φ) for any φ ∈ L 0 and thus we've found a GM45 CS -model M s.t. M |= Γ and M |= φ. Thus Γ |= M GM45 CS φ and by the Completeness Theorem 6.9, we thus have Γ ⊢ GJ 45CS φ.
A construction of such a counter-model for the remaining logic GJ T 45 CS seems to be possible as well. However, a concrete initial advance proved itself to be rather complicated through the regularity condition E(t, φ) ≤ e(φ) and we thus leave this as future work.
Conclusions and further directions
In this note, we exhibited fuzzy analogies to concepts from Justification Logic. More specifically, we replaced classical boolean propositional logic with Gödel fuzzy logic as a base for the modal extensions of Justification Logic. With this, we translated the common semantical approach via Kripke-Fitting possible world semantics to a many-valued setting and, in difference to previous approaches to fuzzy Justification Logic, we considered models with a fuzzy accessibility function. We then provided Hilbert-style axiomatic proof systems for the resulting analogous model classes of the most common representatives of classical Justification Logic and proved a strong standard completeness theorem for all of them and deduced various corollaries in the following. With
Gödel-Mkrtychev models, we also translated a second semantical access point to Justification Logic besides the Kripke-Fitting approach into the setting of Gödel logic for which we provided a second strong completeness theorem for the here introduced proof systems, which is another similarity Gödel-Justification Logic bears with the classical version.
However besides of the here established results, this paper is only one of a few regarding the topic of fuzzy Justification Logics and there remain a lot of interesting question yet still to be answered. In the following, we give pointers to some of the possible directions.
7.1. Forgetful projection and realization. A very prominent result in the classical case is the realization and projection theorems by Artemov, relating a Justification Logic to a classical modal counterpart in the sense that for every theorem of (1) the classical modal proof calculus, there exists an assignment of justification terms to the occurrences of the standard necessity modality s.t. the resulting formula is a theorem in the calculus of the Justification Logic, (Realization), (2) the Justification proof calculus, replacing every justification modality by the standard necessity operator results in a theorem of the classical modal calculus, (Forgetful Projection). For the systems G , G + T , G + 4 and G + T + 4 established in [9] and the systems GJ CS , GJ T CS , GJ 4 CS and GLP CS respectively, introduced in this paper, the Forgetful Projection property follows immediately. It shall be very interesting to see as of if and how the Realization Theorem can be proved in the case of Gödel-Justification Logic and standard Gödel modal logic. In plain Gödel logic, this operator is not definable and thus adds expressive strength. Another common extension is the incorporation of countably many truth-value constants into the language, i.e. adding formulas of the formc for c ∈ C ⊆ [0, 1] for a countable C and stipulating an evaluation ofc in every case as its represented value c. These extensions, especially in combination with one another, are by now well-studied in the framework of basic propositional mathematical fuzzy logic, see e.g. [12] .
As an advantage in the case of Gödel-Justification logic, besides gaining general expressive strength, it might also be interesting to consider graded justification assertions, that is formulas of the type t : c φ :=c → t : φ t : c φ := t : φ →c t c : φ := t : c φ ∧ t : c φ for truth constantsc with the intuitive reading of having at least, at most and exactly a certainty degree of c of regarding t as a justification of φ. These were already studied by Ghari in [18] , [19] in the context of Justification Logic over rational Pavelka logic and considered conceptually different before also by Milnikel in [29] . The additional presence of the crisp projection ∆ might even create various other possibilities for internal definitions of model-theoretically interesting justification assertions.
7.3. Using other fuzzy logics as a base. Among the other prominent representatives for systems of mathematical fuzzy logic, Gödel logic is in general a well-behaved example (e.g. being the only instance enjoying the classical deduction theorem), as this paper additionally exhibits through the similarity of Gödel-Justification logic to many classical cases. However, for future work it might be interesting to consider these other common examples as choices of bases for Justification Logic. Investigations in this already include Ghari's work [19] , where he studies the case of using rational Pavelka logic, i.e. Lukasiewicz logic with truth constantsr for every r ∈ [0, 1]∩Q. But also Lukasiewicz logic alone as well as Product logic shall be very interesting to consider.
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As however already exhibited in [32] , [7] and e.g. [31] , etc., these logics prove themselves already to be quite untamed in the context of classical modal operators, as e.g. the modal axiom (K) (φ → ψ) → ( φ → ψ) 5 As said before, in [18] , Ghari already exhibited the basics of some of these various other systems over crisp frames. is no longer valid over the class of all corresponding Kripke models with fuzzy accessibility function. It should be interesting to see how these logics cooperate with an extension in the spirit of Justification Logic, both in fuzzy-framed and crisp-framed models and if they are respectively strongly axiomatizable.
